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ABSTRACT
Veraldi, Donna, M. A., December 1976 Psychology
The Effects of Temporary States on Helping Behavior (52 pp.) 
Director: Arthur Beamai^/^-—■
The present study was designed to provide an explanation 
of differences in helping rates among success, failure, 
and guilt states. It was based on Zellner's (1970) 
influencibility hypothesis. Subjects were run in a 4 
(Control, Success, Failure, and Guilt) x 2 (Request and 
Requirement) X 2 (Male and Female) design. The study 
found that different rates of helping behavior were ef­
fected by an interaction between internal and external 
events. As well, information from pre- and post­
manipulation questionnaires provided some new information 
concerning the feelings of subjects in the various states. 
Methods of examining these findings more fully in future 
research were discussed.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Definition of the Problem
Altruism is difficult to define. In addition to being 
a complex concept and to having the imprecise common usage of 
any term, it has a number of ethical and philosophic associa­
tions. Webster's (1954) defines altruism as: "Regard for,
and devotion to, the interests of others as an ethical prin­
ciple -- opposed to egoism or selfishness." The term has be­
come entangled with many arguments concerning man's basic 
nature. Freud (1901) stated that individuals are hedonistic; 
to support his theory, it would be necessary to demonstrate 
that no matter how self-sacrificing people's actions may 
appear, they must fulfill, directly or indirectly, some self­
ish needs. In theoretical opposition, Roger's (1961) belief 
that man is innately good portrays man as being basically 
altruistic. Behaviorists would reject both arguments and 
maintain that altruism is a learned response, perhaps reflect­
ing a past schedule of reinforcement, which has instated the 
behavior strongly enough so that it is maintained by second­
ary or minimal amounts of reinforces (Beaman, 1974), that it 
has become a reinforcer itself (Weiss, 1971) or that it is a
1
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socially learned value (Berkowitz, 1968).
While it is interesting to be able to study an area 
with important implications, trying to relate the experi­
mental study of altruism to the philosophical one places 
unnecessary and cumbersome restrictions on the term. heed's
(1963) definition proposed three criteria for altruistic be­
havior :
1) that it be an end in itself (not directed at 
gain)
2) was emitted voluntarily
3) did good.
Use of this definition might limit present research. Since 
both the state of the individual and his surroundings are 
frequently manipulated to produce different results, the 
voluntary nature of the subjects' actions is questionable. 
Furthermore, while some studies test the actual behavior of 
individuals, many studies test only the willingness to do 
the actions. Kazdin and Bryan (1971) found that when measur­
ing willingness to donate blood, they could measure only the 
original volunteering, since few students ever obtained 
parental consent cards and were able to donate blood. The 
results of this, and similar studies, were in line with the 
research measuring actual behavior. Therefore, the stipula­
tion that an altruistic act do good seems primarily to be an 
attempt to fulfill the demands of a philosophic definition.
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Additionally, there is the issue of whether altruistic 
acts must be an end in themselves. It is probably safe to 
assume that a Kitty Genovese (murdered on a street in New 
York) or an Andrew Mormile (left to bleed to death on a sub­
way) would not be concerned with why someone helped them.
Any attempt to save their lives would probably have been 
appreciated no matter whether someone was out looking for 
excitement or assuming that he might get his picture in the 
paper. Similarly, the individual who asks a small favor of 
a stranger or the young lady with a flat tire will probably 
not question a helper's motives. Their primary concern is 
whether they receive assistance.
Darley and Latane (1970) saw the study of altruism 
as involving two basic questions which should be looked at 
separately. The first is the issue of why mankind is altru­
istic. The second is "more specific . . . [and] more amenable 
to research analysis. . . . What determines in a particular 
situation whether one person will help another?" The issue 
is not a moral, but a psychological, one.
Consequently, while it is sometimes desirable to 
study the moral questions, there are many helping behaviors 
that do not fit this definition. Yet they also have value 
to society and are considered important to research. This 
paper will then be concerned with actions that fit under the 
broader category of helping behavior. For convenience, both 
terms will be used interchangeably.
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Although research in altruism is presently receiving 
much attention, interest in the area was minimal until the 
mid 1960s. The area is a difficult one to study because it 
is complex and lacks an easy definition. Despite these 
problems, interest in the area was dramatically rekindled 
by the murder of Kitty Genovese. Although her cries for 
help alerted a neighborhood of 38 people to her peril, no 
one gave any aid. This, and a number of similar incidents, 
caused expert and amateur alike to wonder whether and why 
people had stopped helping each other.
Many opinions were offered: "I would assing this to
the effect of the megalopolis in which we live, which makes 
closeness very difficult and leads to the alienation of the 
individual from the group"; "A disaster syndrome that shook 
the sense of safety and sureness of the individual involved 
and caused psychological withdrawal from the event by ignor­
ing it"; "The gratification of unconscious sadistic impulses"; 
"Lack of concern for our fellow men"; or simply "apathy" and 
"indifference." (From Darley and Latane, 1970).
Notably, while providing few answers about the by­
standers* inaction, the statements agreed on one thing: in
an emergency situation, people are thought to have a strong 
moral obligation to aid others, and if they do not, they are 
considered partly responsible for the victim's fate.
Darley and Latane's book. The Unresponsive Bystander: 
Why Doesn't He Help (1970) was a collection of the first
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studies on bystander intervention. While providing new 
answers to the questions raised, it supported the idea of 
moral obligation. Its approach was to discover why people 
do not help--the implication being that they should. More­
over, it reported that the subjects in the experiments might 
share this attitude. When they "did" nothing, their reaction 
to the situation was not indifference, but rather attentive­
ness, concern, discomfort, and finally, distress:
Subjects who failed to report the emergency 
showed few signs of the apathy and indifference 
thought to characterize "unresponsive bystanders."
When the experimenter entered the room to terminate 
the situation, the subjects often asked if the vic­
tim was all right. . . . Many of these subjects 
showed physical signs of nervousness; they often 
had trembling hands and sweating palms. If anything, 
they seemed more emotionally aroused than did the 
subjects who reported the emergency. (p. 100)
Darley and Latane suggested that the state of arousal charac­
teristic of the "unresponsive" subjects might show that they 
were still in a state of conflict because they had not yet 
decided not to help. Possibly, they were still looking for 
cues to define their role in this ambiguous situation.
Social Norms
Since people seem to believe strongly that help should 
be given in emergency situations, some researchers became con­
cerned with the way social norms might affect helping behavior, 
Berkowitz and Daniels (1963) found that in situations in which 
one individual is dependent on another, the latter will show 
increased helping behavior. They interpreted this finding to
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mean that part of the moral code of society prescribes such 
helping behavior. The problem with using the social norm 
explanation is that different norms apply in different situa­
tions and that norms are so vaguely stated that the predictive 
ability of this approach is seriously limited. Darley and 
Latane (1970), in applying a normative interpretation to some 
of their studies, found that although these explanations could 
be added to the findings, they were cumbersome and did not pro­
vide new information. Moreover, subjects did not report think­
ing about norms when trying to make their decisions. Finally, 
the presence of other people often makes individuals act less, 
rather than more, in accordance with norms, which would sug­
gest that societal pressures do not force people to behave 
altruistically but rather force them to conform to the behavior 
of the group.
If the individual does not rely on social norms, there 
ought to be other information on which he bases his behavior. 
Darley and Latane (1970) proposed a model of intervention as 
a process or series of decisions. This process can be seen 
as consisting of roughly three stages: noticing the incident,
interpreting it, and deciding whether and how to act. These 
stages are affected by social and physical cues as well as the 
state the individual is in at the time he is involved in the 
event. Physical and social cues are generally external or 
environmental factors while the individual's state can be con­
sidered an internal factor affecting this decis ion-making
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
process.
Environmental Factors
Noticing the actual event seems to be the least diffi­
cult step in the process. Darley and Latane (1970) found that 
both the individual's reactions and his later reports showed 
that most of them quickly saw something was happening. The 
stages most affected by environmental factors were interpret­
ing the event as an emergency and deciding whether to inter­
vene. Indidivuals in a room that started to fill with smoke 
reported it 75 percent of the time if they were alone. How­
ever, if they were in the presence of two passive confeder­
ates, they reported it only 10 percent of the time. This sug­
gests that the two passive individuals were providing cues to 
indicate that the situation was not really an emergency and 
should be ignored. In fact, when the experimenter entered the 
room and asked the subjects why they had said nothing, they 
stated that they did not believe there was any danger. Physi­
cal cues may also determine the subjects' interpretation of 
an emergency. Clark and Word (1974) found that helping rates 
are directly related to the level of ambiguity in the situa­
tion. Subjects able to clearly hear and view an accident 
helped 96 percent of the time. If able to hear sounds only, 
they helped only 29 percent of the time. And the presence 
of others (social cues) inhibited helping only in a moderately 
ambiguous condition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In situations in which an individual cannot see other 
people (to depend on cues from them for interpreting the situa­
tion), the knowledge that they are present may still prevent 
the individual from helping by making him feel less responsible 
to help. Darley and Latane (1970) isolated subjects in booths. 
When these subjects heard a neighbor having an epileptic attack, 
their helping rate was 85 percent if they believed they were 
alone compared to 57 percent if they believed four other people 
to be nearby in booths.
Internal States
Whatever the external feedback, the individual’s per­
ception of this information will be heavily affected by his 
own temporary affective state. A great deal of research has 
been directed at the effects of three temporary states on 
helping behavior: success, failure, and guilt. While the
results on each state are fairly consistent, it is difficult 
to combine the data on all three and achieve a comprehensive 
explanation. Consequently, theoretical explanations have 
aimed at explaining the results of particular experiments 
or of one of the three areas, but none have been able to suc­
cessfully integrate any major portion of the data on all 
three states.
Positive States
One of the first studies testing the effects of posi­
tive states on helping behavior was done by Berkowitz and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Conner (1966). They tested the interaction between the sub­
jects’ having succeeded or failed on a simple task and their 
willingness to help an individual who was 80 percent, 50 per­
cent, or 20 percent dependent on them. At the high level 
(80 percent) of dependency, success subjects worked signifi­
cantly harder than failure subjects. Moreover, the inter­
action on the two conditions (success and high dependency) 
increased helping over the controls at lower levels of depen­
dency. Although no conclusions were drawn as to why success 
made people help more or failure less, a post-experimental 
questionnaire offered some information. There was a signifi­
cant difference between the way success and failure subjects 
perceived the situation:
. . . there was even a greater tendency for the 
frustrated men to deny the dependency relation the 
more their peer needed their help, so the failed- 
80% group said there was a significantly lower need 
for their effort than did the successful-80% group.
(p. 668)
The failure subjects reported disliking the experiment more, 
the more dependent their peer was on them. These strong 
feelings of obligation seemed to annoy them, while the con­
trol and success subjects felt a stronger obligation to the 
more dependent peers.
In trying to discover why successful subjects help 
more, Isen (1970) studied the attention paid the situation 
by the success and failure subjects. Again, she found that 
successful subjects helped significantly more than the
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failure or control groups. (There was no significant dif­
ference between the helping rates of failure and control 
subjects in her experiment.) Furthermore, she found that 
successful subjects could recall more of the details of the 
situation than the failure group. The obvious conclusion 
would be that the subjects* paying attention to the situation 
caused them to help more. However, no relationship was 
found between attention and helping so that attention and 
helping were assumed to be independently influenced by the 
treatment conditions.
The discovery of a we11-substantiated relationship 
between success and failure led to attempts to find other 
positive states which might influence helping. Kazdin and 
Bryan (1971) chose to study competence, which they felt might 
be the most important aspect of success. They found that 
subjects who had been given feedback that they were competent 
on both relevant and irrelevant tasks volunteered more often 
to do a physically demanding task (donate blood). As well, 
they rated themselves as being happier, although there was 
no relationship between happiness and volunteering.
Isen and Levin (1972) found a relationship between 
"feeling good" and helping. People who had received cookies 
volunteered more time to help and less time to distract other 
subjects in an experiment. In a second study, they found a 
significant relationship between subjects' finding a dime 
and helping pick up spilled papers (without being requested
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to do so).
Aderman (1972) had subjects read statements intended 
to place them in either an elated or a depressed mood.
Elated subjects had a higher volunteer rate than depressed 
ones when asked to sign up for a noxious experiment. Attempt­
ing to discover the reason for the relationship, he also 
found that requiring elated subjects to do the task decreased 
their rate. Post-experimental questionnaires indicated that 
elated subjects felt freer to turn down the request and that 
depressed subjects resented the pressure and performed reluc­
tantly.
In general, the positive states seem to increase help­
ing rates. This may be related to a general good feeling, a 
feeling of increased competence, or a different way of attend­
ing to or perceiving cues from the environment. On the other 
hand, the negative states so far mentioned do not increase 
helping behavior over control rates and may, in some cases, 
decrease it. Individuals in the negative states seem to feel 
more vulnerable to societal pressures and may lower their 
attention to environmental cues as a means of escape. How­
ever, research concerning other negative states has produced 
contradictory results.
Negative States
Darlington and Macker (1966) found that subjects who 
had failed to earn points for their partners were more willing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to volunteer to donate blood than control subjects, whose 
partners earned points regardless of performance. (This 
difference was significant only after three requests.) Regan 
and Williams (1972) found similar results. Individuals who 
believed they had broken the experimenter's camera were more 
likely to help a female confederate pick up spilled groceries 
than were individuals were believed the malfunctioning camera 
was not their fault. Wallace and Sadalla (1966) worked with 
subjects who were told either that a broken machine was the 
result of their carelessness or that the broken machine was 
not their fault. The "responsible" subjects, when asked to 
volunteer for the most stressful of three experiments, did so 
more often than the "not-responsible" subjects. This result 
seems to appear consistently in the research. Unlike the 
negative states associated with failure, failure which harms 
another leads to increased helping (Berscheid and Walster, 
1967; Rawlings, 1963; Regan, 1966). Failure which harms 
another, along with any situation in which one individual 
feels he has caused harm to another, is commonly referred to 
in the literature as guilt.
Freedman, Wallington, and Bless (1967) studied the 
effect of harm caused by the subjects' failing to report 
relevant information to the experimenter. In their first 
study, subjects were placed in a situation in which they 
lied to the experimenter by telling him that they had no 
previous knowledge of the experiment, when they did. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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experimenter made it clear to the subjects that if they did 
know about the study, he should be told so he would not use 
them. When asked to take part in a second study, they agreed 
more often than the control group. In a second study, the 
subjects unwittingly spilled a set of carefully organized note 
cards. When asked to volunteer to help a graduate student, 
their rate of agreement was higher than the control group 
only when it was not the graduate students whose note cards 
they spilled.
Carlsmith and Gross (1969) forced subjects to harm 
another by making them the "teacher" who was to help a "stu­
dent" learn by shocking him. They found that the highest 
helping rate occurred when someone who had witnessed the event 
asked a favor of the subject. The next highest helping rate 
was for subjects asked for help by the learner (whom they had 
shocked). Finally, the subjects who had only observed the 
learner being shocked had a lower helping rate than the con­
trol group. Other studies failed to replicate this last find­
ing; instead, they showed that observers of harm help as much 
as individuals who actually do harm.
Rawlings (1968) found that the helping rate was higher 
than control for both subjects whose partners were shocked for 
the subjects' errors and whose partners were shocked randomly 
(observed harm). Konecni (1972) replicated these findings in 
a field study. He found that individuals who believed they 
had bumped into the experimenter and forced him to drop his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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cards were more likely to help him pick them up than controls. 
As well, if they had bumped into a confederate (generalized 
guilt condition), they were still more likely than controls 
to help the experimenter. Finally, if they had merely wit­
nessed this situation (sympathy condition), they had a higher 
helping rate than any of the other groups. Regan (1971) also 
found that both those who harm and those who only witness harm 
will show similar helping rates. But she felt that there 
might be some differences in their motivation for helping. 
Subjects in an experiment believed either that a ruined ex­
periment was their fault or a machine's fault. Afterwards, 
they were given a chance to talk to an interviewer about this 
experience. Allowing the guilty subjects to "cathart" lowered 
their helping rate below that of the other guilty subjects.
The subjects who only witnessed the harm were not affected by 
the interview. Regan interpreted this to mean that "guilt is 
the source of altruistic acts in subjects who cause harm, and 
perceived injustice is the motive in witnesses."
One final aspect of the guilt literature that should 
be considered is that of reciprocity. Goranson and Berkowitz 
(1966) showed that subjects worked hardest for individuals 
who had worked for them before. They felt that in many situa­
tions, helping behavior could be explained by the reciprocity 
norm. Some guilt studies have supported this notion.
Berscheid and Walster (1967) found that subjects who set too 
high a quota and caused their partners to lose green stamps
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were more likely to donate their winnings (green stamps) to 
the partner only if they could pay back exactly the same 
amount as was originally lost. In another experiment (Lerner 
and Matthews, 1967), subjects drew slips to see who would be 
in the shock group. Non-shock subjects were more likely to 
aid another subject who had drawn a shock slip only if their 
having drawn the non-shock condition first caused the individ­
ual to be in a shock group (fates interdependent).
These studies provide four theories about the increased 
helping behavior by individuals who have caused or witnessed 
harm. The Social Justice Theory assumes people need to believe 
that social interactions are governed by a sense of justice or 
equity. This theory can account for much of the guilt litera­
ture and also explain why people who merely view harm also 
help. Still, it does not effectively incorporate information 
such as Regan's (1971) finding that guilty subjects and ob­
servers are probably acting from different motives. The Guilt 
Theory presents the harm-doer as someone who is penitent about 
his actions and wants to expiate his guilt by helping. While 
this theory explains the data that the social justice theory 
cannot account for, it does not address the question of why 
people who only view harm are motivated to help. A number of 
researchers present evidence that harm-doers are altruistic 
because they want to increase their lowered self-esteem 
(Carlsmith and Gross, 1969; McMillen, 1971). This approach 
probably explains less of the data than the guilt approach
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and certainly does nothing to handle the reactions of observers 
to harmful situations. Finally, the concept of reciprocity 
seems relevant only to a few experiments (Berscheid and 
Walster, 1967; Lerner and Matthews, 1967). It does not ex­
plain why guilty people help others whom they have not harmed 
and why they sometimes will not help individuals whom they 
have harmed (Freedman, et al., 1967). And it, too, fails to 
account for the literature best explained by the Social Jus­
tice Theory.
Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent (1973) proposed that a
Negative State Relief model will handle all the data on guilt:
altruism is one technique, among many, which people 
use to make themselves feel good; , . . the sight of 
a harmed other caused one to feel bad. . . . The rea­
son that many studies have shown altruism to follow 
transgression is that the first opportunity the ex­
perimenter affords the subject to restore his affec­
tive positivity is the opportunity to be charitable.
(p. 505)
They devised an experiment in which subjects who had either 
witnessed or caused harm were given "relief" -- that is, they 
were given either money or praise. They found that both 
harm-doers and harm-witnesses did not differ in their helping 
responses and that their rate of helping was higher than that 
of controls (at a marginal level). In contrast, the "relief" 
groups of both harm-doers and harm-witnesses did not differ 
from the controls in helping rates.
Although this explanation may be a parsimonious handling 
of the guilt literature, it provides no help in relating
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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guilt to success and failure. Successful subjects, and those 
in other positive states, cannot be assumed to be in a nega­
tive state, yet they do show high rates of helping. And if 
helping is a way to offset bad feelings, failure and depressed 
subjects ought to show increased willingness to help. Finally, 
by concentrating on one state, the Negative State Relief model 
can probably not handle the numerous inconsistencies in the 
literature.
For every temporary state, there is at least one contra­
dicting situation in which there is increased or decreased help­
ing. The exception in positive states is that of Aderman (1972) 
who showed that elated subjects will decrease output if re­
quired to work. The reason that other positive state studies 
show increased helping may be that they dealt with situations 
in which the subjects were free to choose whether or not they 
wanted to help. Literature on negative states shows some 
studies in which helping rates are not decreased below control 
levels (Isen, 1970; Kazdin and Bryan, 1971). Others show that 
failure subjects who have other people dependent on them (Berko­
witz and Conner, 1966) help less than controls. Finally, re­
quiring failure subjects to help increases their helping rate 
over that of success subjects required to help (Aderman, 1972).
The literature on negative states involving harm 
(guilt) is the most inconsistent, possibly due to the greater 
variety of situations which have been studied. Guilty subjects 
will usually help more, except when this helping forces them to
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have further contact with the person they have injured or when 
they feel that helping the injured person will not be equal to 
the amount of harm caused, or when they are forgiven for the 
harm, allowed to talk about their negative feelings, or some­
thing good happens to them. Moreover, individuals who merely 
witness harm are similar to guilty subjects in some ways-- 
they show increased helping and this effect is negated if 
something good happens to them--but are different in that they 
are not "relieved" like guilty subjects by merely talking about 
their experience.
Possibly, in studying temporary states, most studies 
have failed to account for the interaction between internal 
and external conditions, which both provide important cues to 
help the individual decide how to act. Therefore, although 
all of the explanations may be accounting for some of the 
processes involved, so far only a few (Aderman, 1972; Regan, 
1971) have attempted to account for the interaction between 
internal and environmental cues on the individual's perception 
of the situation.
In a related study, Zellner (1970) studied the effect 
of various levels of self-esteem on reception and influence- 
ability. In his review of the self-esteem literature, Zellner 
was faced with inconsistencies similar to those in the help­
ing behavior literature. Different studies reported high, low, 
or medium self-esteem levels as the most susceptible. Zellner 
proposed that there is an optimal level of influenceability for
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adequate adaptation to the human environment. High self­
esteem individuals are also most able to understand complex 
messages; persuasion works best for them. Low self-esteem 
subjects are least résistent to pressure but can best under­
stand simple messages; commands work best for them. Finally, 
the most common forms for communication are probably some­
where between orders and highly persuasive messages, so that 
the most susceptible individuals will probably be somewhere 
between the two extremes; they react to messages of medium 
difficulty and pressure that require conforming behavior.
Zellner designed an experiment using three levels of 
self-esteem (high, medium, and low) and three levels of mes­
sage complexity, which he termed suggestion, conformity, and 
persuasion. In the suggestion condition, individuals were 
required to copy statements of facts; this was considered a 
simple message that put obvious pressure on the individuals. 
In the conformity condition, the individuals were given a 
list of 15 facts to read and learn; this was considered a 
message of medium difficulty. In the persuasion conditions, 
individuals were given an essay to read; this message was 
considered highly complex and highly persuasive. Zellner 
found that high self-esteem subjects were influenced more 
by persuasion than were any of the other groups. Middle and 
high self-esteem subjects were both equally influenced by 
conformity messages. Suggestion produced the maximum influ­
ence on the low self-esteem subjects.
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Hypothesis
The data on the effects of temporary states on help­
ing behavior suggests that these effects may be caused by 
interactions similar to those studied by Zellner. Individ­
uals in positive states seem to respond to requests of high 
and medium difficulty while decreasing their responses to 
commands. Studies of positive states have used either a 
request or have placed the individual in a situation in which 
they saw an individual who needed help (Isen and Levin, 1972; 
Kazdin and Bryan, 1971; Berkowitz and Conner, 1966; Isen, 
1970). The one exception is Aderman (1972). Although he 
found high rates of helping for subjects in positive states 
if they were requested to help, when he required them to 
help, they worked less than failure subjects required to help. 
Notably, this research is also the only one in which failure 
subjects were required rather than requested to do work and 
the only one in which helping rates were increased over suc­
cess .
The data from the guilt literature suggests that 
guilt subjects are responding to the messages of medium diffi­
culty, which would place them in the middle level of influence 
ability. This placement is supported by Back and Bogdonoff’s
(1964) work using physiological responses as a measure of 
stressful social situations. Subjects were told either that 
they had done better, worse, or the same as the rest of the
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group they were in and that the groups were either highly 
cohesive or poorly matched (or no feedback on cohesiveness 
was given). The two sets of subjects that had the strongest 
physiological reactions and conformed the most were the 
success/high cohesive and failure/low cohesive. In both 
cases, conforming reduced stress (lowered physiological re­
sponse). Guilt, or failure which harms another, may also be 
seen as a situation in which the individual feels both that 
he has failed and that he is isolated from others. This 
might indicate why the individuals are eager to respond to 
messages requiring conforming behavior.
Additionally, since witnesses of guilt help at a 
similar rate, they might be compared to the success/high 
cohesive group. They are successful in comparison to the 
luckless individual they are observing and at the same time 
may feel empathy (or closeness) to the individual. Although 
a different social situation from failure/low cohesion, 
success/high cohesion places the individual under stress also 
and makes him react to messages requiring conforming behavior
A more reasonable explanation of the effects of tem­
porary states on helping behavior might be that instead of 
any one state increasing an individual's willingness to help, 
each temporary state changes the individual's level of influ- 
enceability. Consequently, each temporary state changes the 
way an individual will react to a given message or situation. 
The reason that guilt, observed harm, and positive states
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have increased helping behavior so far is that typically 
messages of medium complexity have been used in research.
If both requests [medium complex messages) and requirements 
(low complex messages) are used, different helping rates 
might be observed.
Subjects in a positive state should respond as much 
as guilt subjects to requests and less than guilt or failure 
subjects to requirements. Guilt subjects should respond as 
much as success subjects to requests and more than success 
(or positive state) but less than failure subjects to require­
ments. Failure subjects should respond less than success and 
guilt subjects to requests but more than success or guilt 
subjects to requirements.
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS
Subjects
The subjects were 131 college students from two intro­
ductory Psychology classes. They ranged in age from 18 to 42, 
Approximately two-thirds were female and one-third were male. 
They were run in a 4x2x2 design having four groups (success, 
failure, guilt, and control), two conditions (request and re­
quirement), and both sexes as subjects.
Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in two rooms. The first 
room contained a table, several chairs, and a box (in which 
to place finished questionnaires). The second contained a 
table, two chairs, a box for questionnaires, and some stacks 
of IBM answer sheets.
A "problem-solving test" consisting of 30 difficult, 
easy, or ambiguous questions was administered to the subjects 
Each of the questions was written on an index card so that 
the questions could be presented individually at 45-second 
intervals.
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
Check on the Manipulation
Subjects were administered a questionnaire to check 
for the effectiveness of the success, failure, and guilt 
manipulations (see appendix A). Each of the eight groups was 
divided in half so that the subjects could be placed into two 
different subgroups. Subgroup 1 received the check before 
the manipulations. Subgroup 2 received the check after the 
manipulations. Results from these two checks were compared to 
find how effectively the manipulations had changed the tem­
porary states of the subjects. The reason for administering 
the questionnaire to one-half the subjects before and the 
other half after the manipulations was that otherwise all the 
subjects would have to have taken the questionnaire twice 
within half an hour. This might arouse suspicion in the sub­
jects, and they would probably recall the questions and feel 
that they should be consistent on their answers.
Procedure
The subjects came to the experiment one at a time and 
were met by the experimenter's assistant, who took them to 
the first room, gave them an answer sheet (see appendix B), 
and asked them to fill in the top part of the sheet while 
waiting for the experimenter. At this time, one-half the 
subjects were asked to fill out the questionnaire.
After several minutes, the experimenter entered the 
room and explained the "purpose" of the study;
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This is a problem-solving experiment. We don't 
tell you too much about it before you arrive 
because it's important that it's a new exper­
ience and one that you aren't necessarily pre­
pared for. Our purpose is to try to standard­
ize a problem-solving test so we have to give 
the test to large numbers of people. Then, once 
that's done, we can establish norms for various 
groups. After that, problem-solving ability can 
be related to other measures of intellectual 
ability, such as IQ scores and school success.
While we cannot make any definite statements now, 
we do assume that problem-solving ability is, in 
fact, highly related to intelligence and that if 
you do well in one of these measures, you will do 
well in another.
The tests consist of 30 questions. I'll hand 
them to you one at a time and make sure you 
understand the instructions. Then, it’s a 
timed test so you'll have 45 seconds to work on
the question. At the end of that time, I’ll
say, "time," and you can still write down the 
answer, but you'll be expected to go on from 
there. By the way, feel free to ask questions, 
but try not to cut into your 45 seconds any 
more than you have to. Also, feel free to use
the blank parts of your paper as scratch paper.
Unless the subject had questions, the experimenter
proceeded to present the series of questions one at a time at
45-second intervals. The questions varied according to the
subject's group and reaction to the test. Control, success,
and guilt subjects were given ambiguous or easily answered
questions. Failure subjects were given a mixture of easy,
ambiguous, difficult, and impossible to answer questions to
make them believe that they were missing many questions but
that the test was legitimate.
At the end of the test, the experimenter left the
room to "correct" the test. When she returned, she provided
different feedback to subjects in each of the four groups:
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Control; "I can't tell you specifically how you 
did on each question, but I can tell you gen­
erally how you did. Would you like to know?
Well, you got most of the questions correct, 
which is considered good. Of course. I'll be 
able to let you know more about the test later."
Success: "I can't tell you specifically how you
did on each question, but I can tell you gen­
erally how you did. Would you like to know? You 
did extremely well. In fact, your score placed 
you in the top 10 percent of the people that have 
been tested so far. Moreover, many of your an­
swers to the last set of questions were scored 
as "extremely creative" when compared to answers 
typically given in response to these questions. 
Finally, as I said before, we are not yet sure 
that doing well on this test is related to high 
IQ scores, but it is quite likely this is so-- 
I assume that you probably do well in school and 
at tasks requiring abstract, creative, or problem­
solving ability. Of course, I can tell you more 
about this when we've finished with our testing."
Failure: "I can't tell you specifically how you
did on each question, but I can tell you gen­
erally how you did. Would you like to know?
Well, you scored somewhat lower than I would 
have expected from your grade in school and your 
grade point. Did the timing bother you or did 
you find some of the problems very difficult?
I thought that was so. Well, I've kept your 
address so that I can tell you more after the 
testing is finished."
Guilt: "I can't tell you specifically how you
did on each question, but I can tell you generally 
how you did. Would you like to know? Well, you 
got most of the questions right, which is con­
sidered good, but I would like to ask you one 
question. You're not a junior [senior, freshman, 
sophomore], are you? Oh, no, didn't you see on 
the sign-up sheet where it said freshmen [seniors] 
only? You didn't? Oh, . . .  I thought you were a 
freshman [senior] so I gave you the wrong test-- 
I'm not even sure I can use your test at all. I 
thought I'd get all my freshmen [senior] subjects 
run today and be able to run the information on 
the computer. Well, I was sure something would 
go wrong. Since you came. I'll give you credit, 
but I don't think I can use your test."
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The purpose of these statements was to provide the 
control subjects feedback that they had done adequately and 
the success subjects feedback that they had done extremely 
well. The failure subjects received feedback that they had 
done poorly (after taking a test on which they were unable 
to solve many of the questions). Finally, the guilt sub­
jects received feedback that they had done an acceptable 
job but that they had harmed the experimenter.
Thirty questions were chosen to provide a reasonable 
task for the subjects and yet not take the whole hour. This 
allowed them to be detained longer in the experiment so that 
their willingness to help could be measured.
After the experimenter gave the subjects the appro­
priate feedback, she asked them to go to the next room to 
get their experimental credit card from her assistant because 
she had to meet her next subject. When the subjects went to 
the next room, the assistant asked the half who had not yet 
filled out the questionnaire to do so. He then explained to 
them, "We have a rule at the clinic that you have to be in 
an experiment a full hour to receive credit." In the request 
condition, he continued:
I have these tests that I have to correct by 
tomorrow, but I have to help with this experi­
ment, too. I don't know if I'll get them 
finished on time. You know, you could just 
sit here for the rest of the hour, or you 
could help me if you like.
If the subject agreed to help, the assistant handed 
him a stack of 100 IBM answer sheets. These sheets had
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already been graded, but there was an error in correction on
one-fifth of the sheets. The assistant explained that there
were so many errors, the tests needed to be rechecked. He
explained that the subject was to write the names, on a
separate sheet of paper, of the people whose tests had been
incorrectly marked. Therefore, both the number of tests
corrected and the accuracy of correction could be checked.
In the requirement condition, the assistant again
told the subjects that they must remain for the full hour
and proceeded to assign them some work :
Since you have to be here anyway. I'll have
you do some work. Correct these tests until 
your hour is finished.
He then explained how he wanted the tests corrected and left
the room.
The subjects were left alone in the room for 20
minutes. After this time, the assistant returned to the room
and gave the subjects their credit card. He also debriefed
the failure and guilt subjects by telling them that they had
been given a harder version of the test, by mistake, or that 
he had forgotten to write seniors (freshmen, etc.) on the 
sign-up sheet and the error had been his fault. A more com­
plete statement was prepared and sent to the subjects after 
the completion of the experiment.
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
Helping Behavior
A 4x2x2 (Condition x Pre/Post x Request/Requirement) 
analysis of variance was performed on the number of tests 
corrected by each group. Table 1 shows the results of the 
analysis.
TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF NUMBER OF TESTS CORRECTED FOR 
CONDITION X PRE/POST X REQUEST/REQUIREMENT
Source df MS f
Condition (C) 3 544.46 4.47*
Pre/Post (P) 1 57.31 1
Request/Requirement (R) 1 4.91 1
C X P 3 77.64 1
C X R 3 1650.78 13.56**
P X R 1 244.06 2.00
C X P X R 3 17. 94 1
*p < .05
* * p < . 0 1
This analysis was performed to ascertain whether there were 
differences between any subgroup as a function of when they 
completed the check on the manipulation (either pre or post)
29
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The check on the manipulation should not have any effect on 
the dependent variable. The results supported this conten­
tion in showing no significant main effects for Pre/Post nor 
any significant interactions of other variables with Pre/Post. 
Hence, the Pre/Post check on the manipulation was nonreactive. 
Thus, a second analysis of variance was conducted to test the 
dependent variables relevant to the hypothesis. The second 
analysis of variance was a 4x2x2 (Condition x Sex x Request/ 
Requirement). Table 2 shows these results.
TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF NUMBER OF TESTS CORRECTED 
FOR CONDITION X SEX X REQUEST/REQUIREMENT
Source df MS
Condition (C) 3 544.46 4.67*
Sex (X) 1 832.83 7.14*
Request/Requirement (R) 1 4.91 1
C X X 3 117.15 1.01
C X R 3 1650.78 14.16**
X X  R 1 144.24 1.24
C X X X R 3 49.08 1
*p <.05
**p C .01
Three significant findings emerged from the analysis. Those 
were the manin effects for Conditions (p .05), Sex (p .05), 
and the interaction of Conditions X Request/Requirement 
( P <  .01).
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A Newman-Keuls was performed on the means combined 
for Pre/Post. Table 3 shows the mean number of tests cor­
rected by subjects in each of the eight conditions. As can 
be seen from the table, the number of tests corrected by the 
two guilt groups, the success/request group, and the failure/ 
requirement group were not different from the control groups. 
The two groups lower than the control groups were the success/ 
requirement and the failure/request groups.
A record was kept of the accuracy of correction for 
the eight groups, as an additional dependent variable. Few 
errors were made by any of the subjects in the control, suc­
cess, or failure groups (the mean number of errors for each 
of these groups were .09, .12, and 0, respectively). The 
Newman-Keuls analysis of these data showed that the guilt 
groups (mean number of errors = 1.89) found a significantly 
(p'C.OS) higher number of errors than the other groups.
Check on the Manipulation
A 4x2x2 (Condition X Pre/Post X Request/Requirement) 
analysis of variance was performed on each of the 15 word 
pairs from the questionnaire. While only two of the pairs 
(successful/unsuccessful and guilty/not guilty) described 
states actually being studied, the other pairs provided in­
formation about related feelings. Thus, in addition to 
enabling a check on the effectiveness of the manipulations, 
the questionnaire also made it possible to study the patterns
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TABLE 3
MEAN NUMBER OF TESTS CORRECTED BY SUBJECTS
ACCORDING TO CONDITION AND TYPE OF APPEAL
Condition n X
Control
Request 17 42.47a
Requirement 40.31a
Total 33 41.42a
Success
Request 16 40.94a
Requirement 26.61b
Total 34 33.35B
Failure
Request 16 25.13b
Requirement 45.06a
Total 32 35.09b
Guilt
Request 16 40.94a
Requirement
1 1
40.76a
Total 32 40. 84a
Note: Means having different lowercase subscripts were sig
nificantly different at the .05 level. Means having 
different uppercase subscripts were significantly 
different at the .05 level.
of affective reactions in the four groups. The mean ratings 
by the subjects of their feelings of success is shown in 
table 4. On a scale of one (unsuccessful) to seven (success­
ful), success subjects administered the post-manipulâtion 
questionnaire had a mean of 6.06. While this rating was not
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TABLE 4
MEAN SCORES OBTAINED BY SUBJECTS ON THE 
SUCCESSFUL/UNSUCCESSFUL WORD PAIR
Condition
Control
Pre 17 5.35ab
Post 16 5.31ab
Success
Pre 16 4.71b
Post 18 6. 06a
Failure
Pre 16 5.31ab
Post 16 3.25
Guilt
Pre 16 4.94ab
Post 16 5.50ab
Note: Means having different lowercase subscripts were sig­
nificantly different at the .05 level.
different from the guilt or control subjects, it was signifi­
cantly higher ( p .05) than the success pre group, which indi 
cates the success manipulation was effective.
The failure post group had a mean rating of 3,25.
This was lower than the failure pre group (p .05), which 
again shows that the manipulation worked. In addition, the 
failure post group was lower than all the success, guilt, 
and control groups (pC.OS).
The guilt subjects did not change from pre to post 
measure on success ratings and were not different from the 
control or success groups. Moreover, their rating on the
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guilty/not guilty word pair was 5.37 on a scale of 1 (guilty) 
to 7 (not guilty). This rating was not different from the 
guilt pre (5.31) rating or from the ratings of any of the 
other groups on this word pair (mean ratings ranged from 4.71 
to 5.94). Consequently, it is not clear from this data 
whether the guilt manipulation made the guilt subjects feel 
any different from the success and control subjects.
On several of the other word pairs, the guilt post 
and the success post subjects were not different from the 
control post subjects, but they were different from the 
failure post (p< .05) group while the control post subjects 
were not. Guilt post and success post subjects were higher 
on the favorable/unfavorable and positive/negative word pairs 
than the failure post group (p<C.D5). Notably, control post 
subjects were not higher on these pairs than the failure post 
group. Finally, success subjects were happier and more 
pleased (p <T.05) than the control and failure groups but not 
the guilt groups. In general, success and guilt groups 
showed one pattern of responses and failure and control another 
While this trend was not significant in the present analysis, 
less conservative post hoc tests might point out these differ­
ences .
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
The first hypothesis that successful subjects would 
respond as much as guilt subjects to requests but less than 
guilt or failure subjects to requirements was supported.
The second hypothesis that guilt subjects would re­
spond as much as success subjects to requests and more than 
success subjects to requirements was supported. Part of this 
hypothesis, that guilt subjects would respond less than 
failure subjects to requirements, was not supported.
The third hypothesis that failure subjects would 
respond less than success and guilt subjects to requests 
and more than success subjects to requirements was supported. 
The prediction that failure subjects would correct more tests 
than the guilt subjects was not supported.
This provides support for the primary contention of 
this paper: that perceptions of individuals can be influ­
enced by temporary states enough to create differences in 
their responses to information from the environment. In 
this case, different types of appeals effected different 
rates of helping behavior according to the state the sub­
jects were in.
35
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Several questions about the data need to be considered. 
The first is whether all groups were effectively manipulated 
into the appropriate temporary states.
The results indicate that both the success and the 
failure groups were in the desired states. The responses of 
the subjects to the critical word pair (successful/unsuccess­
ful) as well as many of the other related feelings support 
this conclusion and fit well with information from previous 
research. Feelings of success or increased helping rates 
have been related to feeling "good" (Isen and Levin, 1972), 
to feeling "elated" (Aderman, 1972), to feeling more "com­
petent" and "happier" (Kazdin and Bryan, 1971), and to feel­
ing more "alert" (Isen, 1970). Similarly, failure subjects' 
negative reactions fit well with previous research by Berko­
witz and Conner (1966), who found that failure subjects "dis­
liked" the experiment more and Aderman (1972), who used "de­
pressed" subjects. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that 
an individual in a particular state may experience a number 
of related feelings and that increasing any of these feelings 
may have the same result on his behavior.
The reactions of the guilt group are somewhat more 
difficult to interpret. Since they show no increased feel­
ings in their reaction to the guilty/not guilty word pair, 
the guilt manipulation may not have worked. Nevertheless, 
there is other evidence to the contrary. First, the subjects' 
statements during the experiment seemed to reflect regret for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
their actions. Of the 32 guilt subjects, seven offered to
return at another time or suggested that the experimenter
need not give them credit for their time. Another 10 made
comments during the debriefing that showed some relief:
That’s good. I was just sure I’d read those 
sheets carefully.
Well, I'd rather it was your fault than mine,
I know. I’m bad. I’m bad. Oh, . . .  so 
you're bad, you’re bad.
Only four said they felt no guilt; that is, they believed 
they had not misread the sign or that the experimenter should 
be able to use their results.
Second, studies on guilt typically do not use a ma­
nipulation check but rather infer that the subjects’ reaction 
to the situation shows guilt. In fact, only one other study 
(Peters, 1973) reports using a questionnaire to check for the 
effectiveness of a guilt manipulation. While his study used 
another type of manipulation to create the states of guilt, 
failure, and success, he found results similar to those re­
ported here. There were no differences among the guilt, suc­
cess, and control groups on the success/failure and the guilty/ 
not guilty word pairs. It may be that even if guilt manipu­
lations work subjects may be reluctant to record feelings on 
a guilty/not guilty dimension. It may also be that guilt and 
success feeling states are more similar than had been expected. 
In many ways, failure may more appropriately be labeled a 
negative state.
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Third, two other measures obtained during the experi­
ment suggest that rather than talking about their guilt, the 
subjects tended to be pleasant and cooperative and particularly 
careful about the next task required of them. The guilt sub­
jects were the only ones that consistently made errors in 
reporting which tests had been incorrectly graded. Closer 
inspection showed that the errors were usually due to report­
ing more incorrect tests than were there, often the same two 
tests. If looked at carefully, these tests had some of the 
answers marked part way between the spaces. The "errors” in 
reporting these tests, then, may not have been caused by 
haste, but rather, over-attention to detail.
Even more interesting is the pattern in which the 
guilt subjects responded to the word pairs. It is similar 
to that of the success subjects rather than the failure sub­
jects. It should be noted that part of the feedback given 
the guilt subjects ("You got most of the problems correct, 
which is considered good.") could be considered success feed­
back. However, this same feedback, given the control sub­
jects did not increase their positive feelings over those of 
the failure group. Therefore, if the guilt subjects did per­
ceive this information as positive, it is possible that this 
perception was colored by their feelings of guilt and need 
to emphasize their good qualities.
The results from this experiment are made more diffi­
cult to interpret by their not always being consistent With
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previous work. The greater helping rates by females in re­
sponse to a request by a male assistant have been demon­
strated (Berkowitz and Conner, 1966). However, none of the 
present groups helped at higher rates than those of the con­
trol group. Not only have success and guilt subjects typi­
cally helped at higher rates than control, but also it was 
predicted that the helping rates of the success/request and 
both guilt groups would show these increased helping rates. 
They did not.
This absence of increased helping rates may have 
been caused by the manipulation of the control group. The 
feedback was appropriate in that it affected the state of 
subjects very little. Still, the control subjects came to 
the experiment feeling somewhat positive and successful and 
while the feedback lowered the level of their feelings 
slightly, they were still feeling relatively good. In fact, 
the control subjects were usually one point lower on the 
scale than the success subjects and this difference was not 
great enough to be significant.
It is possible, then, that if the control group had 
been feeling somewhat more "neutral" and had scored between 
3 and 4 on the word pairs, their helping rates would have 
been lower and the helping rates of the other groups would 
have been higher in comparison. But this raises several 
questions about what constitutes a control group. The type 
of influence that would be necessary to exert on control
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subjects to lower their scores to this level would certainly 
be different from the usual notion of providing equal atten­
tion to but otherwise not interacting with these subjects.
Future research may need to use different types of 
control. The pre/post manipulation check allows half of 
each group to act as its own control. Moreover, controlling 
levels of affect of the use of internal analysis to assign 
subjects to groups would allow for comparison of high failure, 
neutral, high success, and guilt subjects.
Conclusions
There were unforeseen methodological problems in this 
study that will require more careful consideration in future 
research. However, the results give support for the use of 
Zellner’s influenceability hypothesis to explain the inconsis­
tent information on helping rates in temporary states.
This conclusion is supported by the lack of a direct 
relationship between the subjects’ states and rates of help­
ing. Instead, there is an interaction between the state of 
an individual, an internal event, and, in this case, the 
message given him, an external cue. The differences between 
success and failure point out this interaction: success
subjects help more than failure subjects if requested to 
work and less than failure subjects if required to work.
These results are similar to Zellner’s (1970), in 
which high self-esteem subjects responded best to complex
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messages and low self-esteem subjects responded best to 
simple messages. That individuals have an optimal level 
of influenceability, according to their feeling at a given 
time, is a useful way of describing these data.
Guilt is somewhat harder to fit into this framework. 
Although the results were as predicted, the reason that 
guilt subjects help at high rates is unclear. Guilt would 
seem to be a negative state, but none of the information 
available on guilt can explain why this ’’negative'* state 
makes people report themselves and behave as if they are in 
a positive state.
Possibly, guilt is a negative state of such power 
that individuals experiencing it are highly motivated to 
reduce or transform their feelings. The literature reports 
several methods guilty subjects use to try to handle their 
feelings: making up for the harm (Darlington and Macker,
1966); confessing the guilt to another party (Regan, 1971); 
obtaining positive reinforcement (Cialdini, et al., 1973); 
and avoiding the harmed victim (Freedman, et al., 1967). In 
fact, after the guilt manipulation was performed in this 
experiment, the subjects attempted to use many of the same 
methods. They would apologize and try to get the experimenter 
to say that their mistake had not been harmful. Then, they 
would frequently change the subject and be concerned about 
their performance on the test, which they interpreted as 
fairly good. Finally, they might offer to help the experi-
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menter by returning at another time or by not requiring 
credit for the experiment. In order to maintain the guilt 
feelings, it became very important to get the subjects away 
from the harmed experimenter as quickly as possible and 
place them in the helping situation so that this would be 
the only method available to them to reduce their feelings 
of guilt.
Understanding the motives of guilty individuals, 
however, is made extremely difficult by their apparent un­
willingness to be open about their feelings. If guilt 
subjects report themselves as feeling positive and act in 
a pleasant, cooperative manner, it is hard to be sure that 
they are feeling guilty, let alone determine their reasons 
for behaving in this manner. Therefore, Back and Bogdonoff's 
(1964) study provides both a possible explanation and a 
logical starting place for understanding guilt. If guilt sub 
jects are feeling both failure and low cohesiveness, then 
their tendency to conform would be much higher than either 
failure or success subjects. This tendency to conform might 
be so strong that it would prevent them from discriminating 
between different types of messages, as was shown in this 
study.
Moreover, using a physiological measure, as was 
done in the Back and Bogdonoff (1964) study might provide 
a more sensitive and accurate estimate of the subjects* 
reactions during the experiment. If this measure were
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combined with a self-report measure similar to the one used 
in this experiment, more information about the differences 
between success and guilt might be learned. It is possible 
that guilt subjects are reporting their feelings as more 
positive than they actually are. This discrepancy would 
probably not be present in the success subjects.
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY
A review of the literature shows that there is much 
interest about the effects of temporary states on individ­
uals' willingness to help when asked. Temporary states of 
success and guilt have been found, generally, to increase 
rates of helping behavior while failure tends to decrease 
it. Unfortunately, few explanations exist about why people 
will help more in one state and less in another. The present 
study was designed to provide an explanation as to why these 
different rates are seen using Zellner's (1970) influence- 
ability hypothesis.
One hundred, thirty-one subjects from two introductory 
Psychology classes were randomly assigned to conditions and 
run in a 4 (control, success, failure, and guilt) x 2 (re­
quest and requirement) x 2 (male and female) design. Success 
and failure were manipulated by feedback concerning their 
performance on a "problem-solving" test. Guilt was induced 
by telling subjects they had signed up under the wrong group. 
Control subjects received feedback that did not alter their 
success or guilt feelings. After the manipulations, subjects 
were either asked or told to grade tests. This served as a
44
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dependent measure. Pre and post experimental questionnaires 
were also completed by the subjects to provide a check on 
the manipulation.
An analysis of variance was performed on both the 
dependent measure and on the self-ratings from the question­
naires. Significant interactions were checked with the 
Newman-Keuls. It was found that the control groups, the 
success/request group, the failure/requirement group, and 
the guilt groups did not differ in helping rates but that 
the success/requirement and failure/request groups helped 
less. Differences among the groups in patterns of responses 
to the word pairs on the questionnaire were also found.
The present study found that different rates of help­
ing behavior were effected by an interaction between internal 
and external events. As well, the information from the 
questionnaires provided some new information concerning the 
feelings of subjects in the various states. It is possible, 
for example, that guilt is a more positive state than was 
previously believed. Methods of examining these findings 
more fully in future research were discussed.
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APPENDIX A
Do not write your name on 
this sheet
Problem-solving ability is influenced by many situa­
tional factors. Some examples are the room you take the test 
in, the people around you, and the way you feel. We try to 
control as many of these influences as possible and like to 
be aware of those we cannot control.
Please help us by reporting your feelings at this pres­
ent time. Your report will be used to average together with 
information from the other people taking these tests to help us 
understand how people feel, generally, while taking tests.
Therefore, feel free to report your feelings honestly. 
When you are finished, leave your sheet in the box on the table
Thank you.
My feelings are best described:
Hi Med Lo Neut Lo Med Hi
Pleasant
Favorable
Positive
Successful
Angry
Good
Insulted
Relaxed
Friendly
Competent
Sad
Cool
Tired
Guilty
Rational
Unpleasant
Unfavorable
Negative
Unsuccessful
Pleased
Bad
Respected
Tense
Unfriendly
Incompetent
Happy
Warm
Wide awake 
Not guilty 
Emotional
47
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APPENDIX B
Name____________ __________________  Address
Telephone_________________ Year in School__
Most Recent Grade Point Average
1. 22.
2. 23.
3. 24.
4. 25.
5. 26.
6. 27.
7. 28.
8. 29.
9. 30. 
10.
11 .
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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